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Beyond the Colonial State: 
Central Bank Making as State Building in the 1930s*
Takagi Yusuke**
The purpose, origin, and strength of the Central Bank of the Philippines remain a
puzzle for students of the Philippine political economy.  Trade policy and fiscal
policy have been well studied within the theoretical framework of a weak state, but
the politics of monetary policy have curiously been overlooked.  As it happens, the
bank enjoyed an excellent reputation as “an island of state strength.”  This paper
sheds new light on the politics of economic policies by arguing that monetary policy
introduced a new type of politics in the 1930s.  This was a period during which a
network of Filipino policy makers emerged and became an incubator for other lead-
ing policy makers in the early years of the Republic of the Philippines.  Established
politicians such as Manuel L. Quezon and American colonial officers paid scant 
attention to monetary policy reform, while these policy makers shouldered the
responsibility of policy proposals.  Their proposal to establish a central bank went
beyond the monetary policy mandate, because they aimed to depart from the con-
ventional market-governed colonial economic structure to a managed currency 
system backed by economic planning.  By focusing on their attempts, this paper
reveals that while the emergent crop of Filipino policy makers were beneficiaries
of the colonial state, they were not satisfied with colonial economic policies and 
worked toward building an independent state equipped with qualified institutions.
Keywords: colonial state, Central Bank of the Philippines, state building,
nationalism, politics of economic policy
Introduction
The process of the setting up of the Central Bank of the Philippines remains a puzzle for
students of the Philippine political economy.  Existing studies, including those done by
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the bank’s first governor, Miguel P. Cuaderno, reveal that Cuaderno, who was respon-
sible for designing the bank when he was the secretary of finance, enjoyed a cooperative
working relationship with influential politicians (Cuaderno 1949; 1964; Valdepeñas 2003). 
The bank, after its establishment in 1949, was regarded as “an island of state strength in
an ocean of weakness [of the state apparatus]” (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 184).  Not 
a few scholars, however, have argued that politicians representing an oligarchic society 
prevented the government from achieving efficient rule through bureaucracy—in other
words, the state in the Philippines was weak (see, for example, Hutchcroft 1998).  How
could bureaucrats establish constructive relations with politicians to form solid institu-
tions, such as the Central Bank, in the midst of a weak state?
Few studies have been undertaken on the politics of the formation of the Central
Bank.  Citing Cuaderno (1964) in a column, Abinales and Amoroso indicate that he played 
a pivotal role in the management of the bank (2005, 184).  Cuaderno himself wrote two
significant books (1949; 1964) but did not provide enough information on the political
process of the formation of the bank.  A historical study by a prominent economist, 
Vicente Valdepeñas (2003), on the development of central banking is helpful but does
not pay much attention to the political context within which policy makers had to
 operate.1)
One exceptional study is Nick Cullather’s diplomatic history on the Central Bank
and its policies from the 1940s to the 1950s, in which he asserts that the US government
supported the establishment of the Central Bank of the Philippines, while the Philippines
did not necessarily share the policy goal to create the bank (Cullather 1992).  Cullather
asserts that Filipino policy makers viewed the bank as a symbol of sovereignty, and yet
he does not touch upon the domestic politics of the time.  Instead, his study highlights 
the discrimination against Chinese and US businesses, the failure of the bank’s develop-
mental policy, as well as graft and corruption in the 1950s (ibid.), as if these were the 
main targets that Filipinos aimed to achieve.  The hypothetical argument we can draw
from his description is that the US government was the only serious actor reluctantly
sustaining the Central Bank in order to protect and promote its own interests in the US
military bases in the Philippines.
The US influence on Philippine economic policy-making should not be overempha-
sized or misunderstood.  Cuaderno gives an impressive account of the Joint Philippine-
American Finance Commission, which officially recommended the establishment of a 
1) Historians mention the existence of attempts to establish a central bank in the 1930s (Golay 1997,
397; Nagano 2010, 46) but have not studied them in detail.  Allan Lumba has studied relations
between the emergence of an image of national economy and the establishment of the Central Bank
of the Philippines (2008) but has not studied the actual involvement of policy makers in the 1930s.
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central bank to the Philippine government in its report published in 1947 (JPAFC 1947,
46–53; Cuaderno 1964, 9–11).  However, what actually happened is that in a series of 
commission meetings the Filipino members had to refute the claims of the American 
members, who opposed the idea of setting up a central bank.  The Filipino members
eventually prevailed on the American members, gaining support from President Manuel
A. Roxas, who was not a member of the commission (Cuaderno 1964, 9–11; Valdepeñas
2003, 85).  In addition, several studies have emphasized US expansionist or imperialist
attempts and actual interventions into Philippine affairs (e.g., Constantino and  Constantino
1978; Jenkins 1985; MacIsaac 1993, Ch. 7, 9; Golay 1997).
A brief review of the literature demonstrates that the stage of Philippine-US rela-
tions was peopled by complicated actors.  First, American residents who still maintained
their influence on the colonial authority in Manila and on Filipino politicians opposed
independence (MacIsaac 1993; Golay 1997).  Second, Americans who supported the 
independence of the Philippine Islands were divided into two groups: the “isolationists”
and the “internationalists” (MacIsaac 1993).  While the isolationists in Congress endorsed 
cutting off relations with the colony as soon as possible, the internationalists in the US
government did not hesitate to intervene in the domestic politics of the Philippine Islands
so that the Philippines would establish an independent government (ibid.).  Third, the 
internationalists paid a great deal of attention to the fiscal discipline of the Philippine 
Insular government (Golay 1997: 330–332),2) although some of them gradually accepted
the protectionism of the Philippine government (Doeppers 1984, 29).  Filipino policy
makers, therefore, though they might have learned from the US experience, could not
depend for support on the United States.  Moreover, they had to deal with pressure from
Manila Americans who were not in favor of the independence of the Philippine Islands.
Their roles should be seriously analyzed.
Early attempts to establish a central bank gave an impetus to the politics of economic
policy.  Three major changes—in terms of actors, ideas, and political contexts—need to
be examined.  First, social change under colonial rule introduced a colonial middle class.
By the beginning of the 1930s many professionals, such as colonial bureaucrats, lawyers,
and professors, formed part of the colonial middle class (Doeppers 1984).  The expansion 
of educational opportunities at all levels, and the Filipinization of bureaucracy, especially
2) “Insular government” was the name of the colonial government, while the Philippine government 
was called the government of the Republic of the Philippines.  Although the Philippines became 
independent only in 1946, Filipino policy makers often assumed their government to be the govern-
ment of the Filipino people.  This writer uses “Insular government” to emphasize the viewpoint of 
American colonial officers and “Philippine government” to highlight the initiative by Filipino policy 
makers.
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under the Francis B. Harrison administration (1913–21), created a colonial middle class in 
Manila who established their careers in white-collar jobs (ibid.).  In fact, several delegates
at the Constitutional Convention in 1934 belonged to the new generation of professionals, 
and therefore the convention could be assumed to be a “national congress” whose rep-
resentatives had different antecedents from the traditional elites (Uchiyama 1999, 201).
Second, the members of this emerging colonial middle class expounded new ideas 
in their discussions at the Constitutional Convention (De Dios 2002).  The inflow of inter-
national policy ideas such as economic nationalism (Aruego 1937, 658–669) and a strong
presidency (De Dios 2002) greatly influenced the delegates.  It is to be noted that, how-
ever sensational and well accepted at the convention, the idea of an international inflow
of ideas was still taboo in the existing interest structure that had shaped the patronage 
politics that Manuel L. Quezon, the tycoon of colonial politics, made the best use of 
(McCoy 1988).3)
Third, we cannot overlook the fact that the formation of the Constitutional Conven-
tion was a part of the Filipino effort toward state building.  US colonial rule had brought 
into the Philippine Islands both political machines and politics by reformers (Abinales
2005).4)  While the former were characterized by patronage politics, the spoils system, 
and a cautious attitude toward the expansion of the influence of the federal government, 
the latter were led by those who aimed at overcoming political machines by strengthen-
ing the administrative capacity of the federal government in the United States (ibid.).
While Quezon established his career making the best use of patronage politics (McCoy
1988), the aforementioned middle class apparently emerged from the latter aspect of the
US influence, or the effort toward state building.  A series of US policy changes, including 
the passage of the independence act in the 1930s, prompted Filipino policy makers to
recognize the necessity to work for state building themselves, because the policy changes 
in the United States took place without consideration for the situation in the Philippines,
as we will see below.
In a nutshell, this paper demonstrates that the emerging professionals, international 
inflow of policy ideas, and resurgence of nationalism motivated a handful of powerful
Filipino policy makers to strive to establish a central bank.  Although their proposals 
3) The appeal for economic nationalism was irrelevant to the agenda of the sugar industry.  The sugar 
industry has been assumed to have had the strongest vested interest, pressuring politicians, includ-
ing Quezon, to seek ways to maintain the status quo (Friend 1963; Golay 1997).
4) Abinales, however, concludes that the US colonial endeavor resulted in the creation of the founda-
tion of the “cacique democracy” (Abinales 2005, 173), which is a type of “democracy” dominated 
by the cacique, or local landlord (e.g., Anderson 1988).  This writer appreciates the kind suggestion 
of Professor Patricio N. Abinales (University of Hawai‘i) to refer to the insightful Building a New
American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (Skowronek 1982).
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failed to materialize before independence, the policy makers elaborated on the idea and
succeeded in establishing the bank in 1949.  Through a study of the early attempts, this
paper explores the ideas among policy makers in the 1930s that would result in the 
creation of the Central Bank in the 1950s.  The first section examines the origin of the
idea through a study of the first initiatives from 1933 to 1935, when US policy changes
prompted Filipino policy makers to recognize the necessity of autonomy.  The second
section, covering the period from 1935 to 1944, analyzes subsequent political contexts
where the key advocates continued to work for their goals despite indifference and oppo-
sition from government authorities.
I Independence Act, Monetary Policy Change in the United States,
and a Central Bank, 1933–35
I-1 First Independence Act and Creation of the Philippine Economic Association in 1933
The passage of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting (HHC) Act in the US Congress in 1933 led to a
political power struggle among leaders of the dominant Nacionalista Party, with Senate
President Quezon on one side and Senator Sergio Osmeña and Speaker Manuel A. Roxas 
of the House of Representatives on the other.5)  The power struggle was an opportunity 
to consider the economic consequences of independence.  Opposing the HHC Act in a
speech, Quezon described it as a tariff act rather than an independence act (Golay 1997,
320).  He said: “All I can say for the present is that the National City Bank [of New York]
took an active interest in the passage of the Hawes-Cutting bill, . . .” (Tribune, January
1, 1933, 1, 19).6)  He argued that the National City Bank worked for the passing of the 
HHC Act in order to protect Cuban sugar at the expense of Philippine sugar (ibid., 1;
Golay 1997, 320).  Quezon’s attack was so harsh that a split in the party was inevitable
in early January 1933 (Tribune, January 3, 1933, 1).
Quezon expressed his opposition to the HHC Act on various occasions.  When he
was invited by a group of economists on March 17, 1933, he argued that the economic
features of the act were so unfavorable to the Philippine Islands that social unrest could
5) Osmeña and Roxas led the Philippine independence mission (Os-Rox mission) when the US Con-
gress passed the HHC Act, while Quezon stayed behind in the Philippine Islands.  Osmeña and
Roxas could take the credit for winning the independence act and, therefore, prevail over Quezon
(Agoncillo and Alfonso 1961; Friend 1965; Golay 1997).
6) The Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act was composed of the Hare Bill in the US House of Representatives
and the Hawes-Cutting Bill in the US Senate and was sometimes referred to as the Hare Bill or
Hawes-Cutting Bill.
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result in the rebirth of the military government rather than a commonwealth government 
(Tribune, March 18, 1933, 1).  He explained that when the United States imposed the full
tariff rate on Philippine sugar three years after the passing of the act, the US market 
would be virtually closed to Philippine sugar; this would precipitate the collapse of the
export industry and be followed by massive unemployment, social unrest, and ultimately
another military suppression by the United States (ibid.).
The group of economists who invited Quezon seemed to have been the founders of 
the Philippine Economic Association (PEA).  The following three points support this 
assertion: first, Cuaderno points out that the PEA was organized after the passage of the
HHC Act (Cuaderno 1949, 1).  Second, the presiding officer of the day was Elpidio Quirino, 
who would have been the president of the PEA (Tribune, March 18, 1933, 2; PEA 1934).7)
Third, the PEA’s first two publications indicate its gradual development as an organization
from March 1933 (PEA 1933; 1934).  Who, then, were the members of the PEA?
Table 1 is a compilation of biographic data about the founding members whose names 
were recorded in the first publication of the PEA (1933, I).  From Table 1 we can glean
three characteristics of the members.  First, the only politician was Quirino, although
some members had seats in the legislature.  Second, the majority were bureaucrats with 
no visible representatives from any particular industry.  Third, most of the members 
either studied economics or worked for administrations covering economic issues, and
almost half of them went to the United States to study.  All these points reflect the 
political as well as social developments under US colonial rule.  These points are elabo-
rated on below.
First, Quirino’s political career reflected the shifting phases in the politics of inde-
pendence.  Quirino, born in 1890 in Ilocos Norte, graduated from the University of the
Philippines and became a public school teacher, a law clerk of the Philippine Commission,
a legislator, and finally a senator.  He was younger than Quezon by 12 years and estab-
lished his political career under Quezon’s tutelage after he met the latter at the Philippine
Columbian Club (Gwekoh 1949, 23).  When Quirino was a clerk of the commission he
also worked as a secretary of the club to get acquainted with the leading figures of the
day (ibid.).  Once he was elected to the Senate in 1925, he was appointed by Quezon as 
chairman of the Committee of Accounts and subsequently as chairman of the Special
Committee on Taxation, because “a majority of lawyers of the old school [in the Senate]
depended not only on the vigor of their young colleagues but on the steady flame of their
7) The journalist and biographer Sol H. Gwekoh, in a biography of Quirino, wrote that Quirino organ-
ized the PEA to study economic issues (Gwekoh 1949), while the authors of the PEA do not
specify any single president or founder in the first pamphlet of the PEA (PEA 1933).
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Table 1 Membership of the Philippine Economic Association
Name Educational Background Profession Position, Affiliation*
1 Salvador
Araneta












University of the Philippines/
University of Chicago
Educator Dean, College of Business Administra-






University of the Philippines/
Columbia University
Educator Dean, College of Business Administra-
tion, University of Manila
6 Anastacio 
de Castro





Chief of cooperative marketing and





Special agent, Department of Finance
8 Tomas
Confesor







Director, Bureau of Commerce
9 Jose
Espino
N.A. Bureaucrat N.A., Bureau of Customs
10 Vicente
Fabella





Dean, Jose Rizal College
11 Fermin 
Francisco








Harvard University Bureaucrat Undersecretary, Department of 
Finance
14 Leon Ma. 
Gonzales
Harvard University Bureaucrat, 
educator
Chief of the Division of Statistics, 




University of the Philippines/
Columbia University




N.A. Bureaucrat Chief agent of the inspection division,
Bureau of Internal Revenue
17 Catalino
Lavadia
N.A. Bureaucrat Director, N.A.
18 Abdon
Llorente









University of the Philippines Politician,
lawyer
Senator
21 Manuel L. 
Roxas




Professor, University of the 








N.A., Bureau of Internal Revenue
23 Nicanor 
Tomas




University of Santo Tomas Bureaucrat, 
businessman
Secretary of Finance/President, 
National Life Insurance Company
Sources: Membership from PEA (1933, 1); bibliographical information from Galang (1932), Cornejo (1939), 
Hayden (1942), Flaviano (1950), BSP (1998), and Tribune (various issues).
Note: * The writer has edited information on their main affiliations to specify the characteristics of the members. 
In some cases, however, he has had to rely on sources listing their affiliations only after 1933.
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mid-night lamps [to study the new problems of economics]” (ibid., 31–32).8)  Quirino 
became so familiar with economic policy that he was referred to as the “high priest of 
protectionism” in a personal sketch published in the 1930s (Cabildo 1953, 13).  Quirino,
as well as Roxas—whom we shall study in the next section—belonged to the generation 
for whom the economic consequences of independence became an agenda, while Quezon 
and Osmeña belonged to the generation for whom independence itself was the prime 
concern.
Second, 15 of the 24 PEA members were former or incumbent bureaucrats working 
in various departments in charge of economic policy.  For instance, Miguel Unson, born 
in Iloilo in 1877 and a graduate of the University of Santo Tomas, was a prominent 
bureaucrat who had been a provincial treasurer as well as an undersecretary and secre-
tary of finance (Cornejo 1939, 2193).  In addition to him, incumbent Undersecretary of 
Finance Guillermo Gomez was an original member.  There were many members who
must have had firsthand information of fiscal conditions as officers of the Bureau of 
 Internal Revenue or Customs, both of which were supervised by the Department of 
Finance.  Meanwhile, Tomas Confesor and Cornelio Balmaceda were director and assis-
tant director of the Bureau of Commerce, which was supervised by the Department of 
Agriculture and Commerce.  The PEA functioned as a network of bureaucrats from 
various economic agencies of the government.
While bureaucrats occupied the majority of seats, the business sector was repre-
sented by a few individuals as well.  Salvador Araneta, born in Manila in 1902, studied at
Harvard University and became a partner in a law firm in the Philippines.  The businesses 
he engaged in included the National Railroad Company, a sugar firm, and several mining
companies (ibid., 1602).  He was not a representative of any particular industry but was 
a very active member of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce.  He eventually joined in
the founding of the National Economic Protectionism Association (NEPA) in 1934.9)
Unson became another prominent representative of the business sector when he shifted 
to the insurance industry, but, as mentioned above, he established his early career as a
bureaucrat.
Third, all PEA members shared a knowledge of economics.  They learned eco nomics 
either through education in school or from the school of hard knocks.  A member of the
8) Gwekoh also mentioned that Quirino and Jose P. Laurel (later the president under Japanese military 
rule) were “the first two graduates of the University of the Philippines to be elected to the Senate 
and as the first English-speaking senators” (Gwekoh 1949, 30–31).
9) Araneta did not display an interest in any particular industry, although he would become close to 
the sugar industry in the 1950s (Takagi 2008).  Gerardo Sicat recorded that Araneta disputed with 
representatives of the sugar industry in the 1960s (Sicat 2002, 2).
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PEA, Professor Abdon Llorente of Far Eastern University wrote a column in which he
described the dawn of economics in the Philippines (Llorente 1935).  The column sug-
gested that the PEA included most of the pioneering economists of the time, although it
did not mention the association directly.  Llorente, for instance, praised Dean Conrado
Benitez of the College of Business Administration from the University of the Philippines,
together with Confesor, Vicente Fabella, Fermin Francisco, and others as “men who 
crossed the sea in the early days of American regime to delve into the intricacies of 
economics” (ibid., 16).  Andres V. Castillo, who was born in 1903 and earned his  bachelor’s
degree from the University of the Philippines and his doctorate from Columbia Univer-
sity, followed the path of these men and joined the PEA.  He was the dean of the College
of Business Administration in the University of Manila in 1934 (Tribune, August 19, 1934, 
17; BSP 1998, 37).  Meanwhile, Llorente praised Unson, who led a group of practitioners,
including Gomez, because they “began the study of economics from the so-called uni-
versity of hard knocks” (Llorente 1935, 16).  He also commended Quirino as the one
“who can easily lead to [sic] the oldsters as well as the youngsters” and “who has in him
the making of a Hamilton” (ibid.).
With regard to their education, at least half the PEA members studied in the United
States—either through private funding or on a scholarship from the government.  Recipi-
ents of the latter were called pensionados.  Llorente described it thus: “The pensionado
system, which was discontinued about 1910, was resumed in 1919.  From 1919 to 1930,
379 students were sent by the government to the United States.10)  Of this number, 58
took up the study of different branches of economics. . . . These returned pensionados
are now employed as follows: 21 as government employees, 7 as teachers, 1 as a prac-
ticing attorney, 3 as actuaries, 3 as life underwriters, 2 as newspapermen, 7 in business
and 2 as farmers” (ibid.).  The pensionados were selected beneficiaries of the colonial 
policy and organized their own social club, known as the Philippine Columbian Club, in
1905.11)
As the following section shows, however, their experience in the United States did
not turn them into pro-US economists.  Carlos Quirino, a leading postwar journalist, 
asserts that pensionados became even more nationalistic because of their stay abroad 
and that “this [Philippine Columbian] club became the focal point in the nationalistic 
campaign for independence for the next three decades” (Quirino 1987, 39).  Quezon, in
fact, delivered the aforementioned critical speech on the HHC Act at a luncheon meeting 
10) In August 1903 the pensionado system was introduced, under which “About 200 Filipinos were sent 
to the United States between 1903 and 1912” (Agoncillo and Alfonso 1961, 356).
11) Homepage of the Philippine Columbian Association (http://www.pcaopen.org/PhilippineColumbian/
aboutus.php).
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of this club.  In this context, it is intriguing that Llorente encouraged Filipinos to go to
the United States, referring to Americans who had studied economics in Germany or
Austria-Hungary in the last century.  He praised Quirino as a man who understood
 Alexander Hamilton, who was US Secretary of the Treasury during the George  Washington
administration (Llorente 1935, 13).  The German school of economics in the nineteenth
century, which was influenced by the ideas of Hamilton, was famous for its nationalist
orientation wherein scholars were skeptical of the effectiveness of free trade for newly
independent nations (Lichauco 1988, 32–49).
Those who established the PEA adopted the idea of positive role of regulation in
economic activities by the government, which the American Economic Association (AEA) 
advocated since the end of the nineteenth century (Skowronek 1982, 132), although
neither Llorente nor Lichauco mentioned the name of the AEA.  AEA was in fact estab-
lished by the American economists who were skeptical to American Social Science 
 Association which tended to advocate the idea of laissez-faire (ibid.).  In fact, names such 
as (Johann G.) Fichte or Friedrich List, who were German nationalists, especially the
latter, and pioneers of the German school of economics (Lichauco 1988, 44–49), were
mentioned in a speech by the well-known Filipino businessman Benito Razon.  Razon
was the founding president of the NEPA, for which Llorente later worked as a manager
(Tribune, February 10, 1935, 17; May 29, 1935, 16).
The PEA members were, however, not yet radical in their first publication, The 
Economics of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act: An Analysis (hereafter, An Analysis), where
they criticized the independence act instead of proposing their own economic policy (PEA 
1933).  In I, “The National Bonded Indebtedness,” they studied the Philippine govern-
ment’s fiscal stability as well as its ability to redeem bonds and concluded, “The present 
sinking fund arrangement is sufficient to guarantee the ultimate redemption of the Phil-
ippine government bonds, and any additional guarantee for their redemption, like the
export tax, is not superfluous but is also harmful to national interests” (ibid., 5).  They 
focused on the adversarial effect of export tax, which the HHC Act required the Philippine
government to impose.  In the subsequent two sections, which devoted 28 of the total
40 pages to the topic (II, “The Export Tax,” and III, “Effects of Limitations Imposed on
Foreign Trade”), they reiterated that the Philippine government could pay its obligation
and that it would be faced with difficulty once it was compelled to impose export tax.
The authors criticized the HHC Act as if they were aiming to maintain the status
quo, although (or perhaps because) they recognized the fragility of the existing economic
structure.  While they admitted that free trade between the Philippine Islands and the
United States had contributed to the rapid expansion of export industries such as the
sugar industry, they argued that “development [of the export industries] has stood on a
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weak and unstable foundation.  Its ultimate effect has been to place the Islands in a state
of almost complete dependence upon the United States market” (ibid., 8).  They did not
yet argue that the Philippines should change its economic structure.
Reflecting the conservative tone of other sections, the authors did not advocate any
radical proposal in IV, “Currency.”  Here they concluded, “As long as the present free 
trade . . . remains the same there is hardly any need for autonomy in currency legislation
because goods like anything else follow the line of least resistance” (ibid., 38).  They 
hypothetically mentioned that the Philippines would need to depreciate its currency to
seek new export markets in Asia, especially if it could no longer export its products to
the US market (ibid.).  The authors recognized that “it is necessary to have our currency
at our absolute and free control to provide us with one of the instrumentalities for estab-
lishing markets in other countries.  We cannot ‘remain on a gold island in the midst of a
sea of depreciated currency’” (ibid.).  They knew what they needed to do once the current
arrangement was abandoned, but they did not present their own comprehensive policy
proposal yet.12)
The critical but conservative tone of An Analysis apparently reflected the political 
position of Quirino, who was close to Quezon.  On the same day that Quezon delivered
his speech, Quirino “declared that the Hawes-Cutting-Hare Act is a challenge to the 
Filipinos” (Tribune, March 18, 1933, 2).  It is, however, more important to remember the
origin of An Analysis.  The PEA responded to a US policy change and limited its activity
to the issue involved.  Another US policy change would prompt the PEA to work on 
another issue.  But before we study the PEA’s next activity, we examine an official 
response from within the government to the US policy change.
I-2 The Gold Embargo in the United States and the First Proposal to Establish a Central
Bank in the Philippines, 1933–34
The year 1933 is pivotal not only because of the HHC Act but also because of a drastic
change in US monetary policy.  Faced with a series of banking crises after the Depression, 
American President Franklin D. Roosevelt “had grown convinced that ending the Depres-
sion required raising prices to their 1929 level” (Eichengreen 1992, 331).  Roosevelt,
pressured by Congress to adopt a more radical proposal for inflation, placed an embargo
on gold exports and endorsed the Thomas Amendment authorizing the president to take
various inflationary measures on April 19, 1933 (ibid., 331–332).  This piece of news was 
sensationally reported in the Philippines (Tribune, April 21, 1933, 1).
The Filipino populace attempted to understand the implications of the US measures 
12) Regarding their comprehensive policy proposal, see the next section.
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by turning to the knowledge of professionals.  Castillo’s remark was, for instance, pub-
lished as an explanation by a “Filipino political economist” (Tribune, April 23, 1933, 5). 
The latter wrote in a relatively pedagogic manner that inflation would stimulate the
domestic economy although there was a risk that it could result in hyperinflation, such 
as that experienced in Germany in 1923 (ibid., 5, 25).  In the context of our study, it is 
more interesting that he briefly mentioned, “It cannot be overemphasized that a managed
Philippine currency would serve the country best at this time. . . . Unfortunately there
is no central bank in the Philippines upon which the task of managing the currency could
be very well entrusted” (ibid.).  Although it took some time before the currency issue
was connected to the issue of central banking, there was a gradual development of the
policy proposal within the government.
Acting Secretary of Finance Vicente Singson-Encarnacion (hereafter, Singson) took 
the lead in handling the situation.  Singson was also mentioned as a pioneer of economics
by Llorente (1935, 16) and would be a significant advocate for the formation of a central
bank.  He was born in 1875 in Ilocos Sur, graduated from the University of Santo Tomas, 
passed the bar examination, and became a fiscal (public prosecutor) of provincial govern-
ments, a representative of the Philippine Assembly, as well as a senator (Cornejo 1939,
2143).  His career path was seemingly similar to that of his contemporaries, such as 
Quezon and Osmeña, but it differed from them in two ways.  First, he was in the minor-
ity in the legislature as a member of the Federal Party (Quirino 1987, 44), although he
maintained close relations with American colonial officers and was a member of the 
Philippine Commission from 1913 to 1916.  The second point that distinguished Singson’s 
career from Quezon’s and Osmeña’s was his experience in private business.  He was an 
entrepreneur in the insurance and finance industry.  He worked for the Insular Life 
Assurance Company (Insular Life) first as a director and later as the president (Tribune, 
August 15, 1934, 16).  He also worked for the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as a direc-
tor (Willis 1917, 418; Nagano 2003, 226).  These two institutions are significant in the
historical development of the finance industry in the Philippines.  While Insular Life,
founded in 1910, was the first Filipino-owned life insurance company (Batalla 1999, 22),
the PNB, founded in 1916, was the first multipurpose government bank.  It functioned
as an agricultural financial institution, a commercial bank, and a bank of issue (Nagano 
2003, 197–198).  Singson achieved a great deal in business and was appointed as secretary
of agriculture and commerce on January 1, 1933.
Agriculture and Commerce Secretary Singson promoted local production and 
domestic commercial activities through the Bureau of Commerce, which his department 
oversaw.  Under his leadership, the government established the Manila Trading Center
and organized the first “Made in the Philippines Products Week” in August 1933 in order
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to promote local production and domestic trade (Stine 1966, 85).  Balmaceda, a member 
of the PEA and assistant director of the Bureau of Commerce, said that Secretary  Singson
took the initiative to organize the Products Week and to establish the center (Tribune, 
December 30, 1933, 6).
Singson was concurrently appointed as acting secretary of finance on April 21, 1934, 
after Rafael Alunan, a representative of the sugar industry, resigned from the post
 (Tribune, August 15, 1934, 16).  In the Finance Department, Singson took the initiative
to reduce Philippine dependence on the US economy.  Informed of a possible change in
the Philippine monetary system from the gold exchange standard to the dollar exchange
standard in June 1934, he expressed his serious concerns about its “harmful” effect on
the Philippines (Singson to Governor-General, 1933, JWJ, 2).13)  In a memorandum dated 
July 6, 1933, he commented on the following two points: first, he argued that it was
undesirable to link the Philippine currency system to the US one “much more intimately” 
(ibid.).  He was worried about a situation where the Philippine currency would become
more vulnerable to US currency policy, since the latter was managed regardless of Phil-
ippine conditions.  Second, he believed that US inflationary measures would adversely
affect the Philippine economy.  He asserted, “In many cases, the likelihood is that this
country would be the loser in the sense that its currency would depreciate in value . . .”
(ibid.).  Based on these considerations, he proposed inviting a monetary expert to con-
sider whether the Philippine Islands should establish an independent monetary system
or not (ibid.).
Singson aimed to gain autonomy for economic policy-making through the inde-
pendent currency system.  In another memorandum to the governor-general on August
5, 1933, he suggested that the Philippine government establish a monetary system sus-
tained by the gold bullion standard rather than the dollar exchange standard.  He also
proposed that the government devalue the peso by half the current ratio (Quirino to 
Governor-General, 1935, JWJ, 2–5).  The Philippine government had a gold exchange 
standard that functioned through gold deposits in New York prior to April 1933.  Mean-
while, Singson proposed the establishment of a gold bullion standard, which required the
government to establish a totally new monetary standard.14)  The other proposal, devalu-
ation, was heading in the same direction of reducing Philippine dependence on the United
13) The Harry S. Truman Library keeps the J. Weldon Jones papers, which are a record of an influential 
American colonial officer, J. Weldon Jones.  Professor Nagano Yoshiko (Kanagawa University) kindly 
shared her copies of the papers with this writer.  This writer appreciates her generous support. 
Hereafter, materials from the collection are cited as follows in the text: (sender’s name to recipient’s 
name, written year, JWJ, page number/s).  Details are provided in the reference list.
14) Castillo clearly distinguishes the gold bullion standard from the gold exchange standard (Castillo 
1949a, 352–354).
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States because it would encourage Philippine exports to other countries.
While Singson continued to appeal for the services of a monetary expert, he made
another policy proposal: founding a central bank in the Philippines (MacIsaac 2002, 159).
After he came back from the United States, where he joined Quezon’s last independence
mission, he publicly “advocated the separation of the control over the monetary system
from the government, and the establishment of a central bank to assume such control
under the government supervision” in a speech at a banquet for Singson and Unson on
May 17, 1934, hosted by the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippine Islands then headed 
by Eugenio Rodriguez (Tribune, May 18, 1934, 1, 7).  The proposed central bank, accord-
ing to him, should be a bank of the government, a bank of banks, and a bank whose
responsibility was to manage the integrity and stability of the national currency.
The benefits Singson emphasized were the bank’s contributions to fiscal discipline
and the expansion of commercial credit (ibid., 7).  He argued that because the democratic 
government tended to carry out inflation-oriented policies to gain support from the 
 people, the commonwealth government would not be able to resist the temptation to fall
into inflationary finance unless it directly managed its currency policy (ibid., 1, 7).  With 
regard to the credit market, he recognized the existence of doubts over the usefulness
of a central bank at a time when the credit market had not yet fully matured.  He argued, 
though, that “there is no better instrument to develop credit in a nation than the estab-
lishment of a central bank” (ibid., 7).  Under the circumstances, what was the basis for
his conviction?
In the speech mentioned above, Singson brought up the emerging international 
policy idea of establishing a central bank.  He said, “The body of financial experts and 
economists of the League of Nations, about five years ago, had recommended the estab-
lishment of central banks where such banks do not exist” (ibid.).  The Financial Commit-
tee of the League of Nations founded a Gold Delegation to conduct research on problems
of the gold standard in 1929 and published the results of the research in several reports
from 1930 (Eichengreen 1992, 250; Sudo 2008, 2–3).  After World War II, European
countries and the United States attempted for more than a decade to establish a system-
atic cooperation to respond to international monetary problems (Eichengreen 1992, Ch. 
6–7).  They failed to resolve the problems but held several conferences and published
reports with recommendations.  Regardless of the results of the efforts of the League of 
Nations, Singson used the recommendations for his proposal.  Drawing examples from
other countries, Singson also emphasized the necessity of establishing an independent
central bank, citing responsibilities that the existing PNB could not fill.  He argued that
a central bank should be independent of the government and that the PNB should con-
centrate on long-term finance for the development of agriculture as in the case of Greece 
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(Tribune, May 18, 1934, 7).  He elaborated his proposal through a study of the recom-
mendations of international organizations or cases from other countries.15)  It is obvious
that he was determined that the Philippines prepare the institutions necessary for an
independent state.
In addition to these proposals, Singson expressed his interest in economic planning
so as to change the economic structure of the Islands.  On another occasion, he pointed 
out that “excessive attention was given to the development of the sugar industry while
practically abandoning the other industries, so that when the crisis came in sugar, the
country faced a great economic difficulty. . . . What is lacking, he said, is a plan” (Tribune, 
June 13, 1934, 1, 11).  He clearly recognized and publicly announced the necessity to
change the economic structure, which depended too much on the sugar industry.  Eco-
nomic planning in this context was not only an economic preparation for independence,
but also a political challenge to those who were supported by the sugar industry.
Singson’s multiple proposals to change the Philippines’ economic structure failed
to receive support either from Quezon or from the influential Americans.  We can hardly
find a written document directly explaining Quezon’s motive but can still use the data
that mention two influential groups that were close to Quezon opposed Singson’s pro-
posals.  The sugar industry, which had enjoyed easy loans from the PNB and established
close relations with Quezon (Larkin 2001), opposed the idea of establishing a central bank 
(Cullather 1992, 81).  Most American residents, or so-called Manila Americans, were 
beneficiaries of the existing free trade and opposed the independence of the Philippines
(Golay 1997, 332–333).  In the Philippine Insular government, Governor-General Leonard 
Wood reconstructed the currency system based on the idea of “self-regulating mar-
kets” with the least intervention from the government (Giesecke 1987, 117–124).  J.
Weldon Jones, who was the Insular Auditor and “a valuable adviser to [Governor-General
Frank] Murphy” (Golay 1997, 331), was concurrently appointed the adviser on currency
to the Governor-General almost at the same time when Singson advocated making a
central bank (Tribune, June 2, 1934, 3).  Jones was one of those who undoubtedly opposed
 Singson’s proposal, as we will see below.  Singson left the government without imple-
menting any of his proposals when Governor-General Murphy appointed Quirino as the
secretary of finance and Rodriguez as the secretary of agriculture and commerce on July
14, 1934 (Tribune, July 15, 1934, 1, 7).
15) The Philippine Insular government from the beginning paid attention to the example of other coun-
tries in its attempts at reshaping the banking industry.  Nagano mentions that the government asked
the American financial expert Edwin Kemmerer to study and make a report on the Agricultural
Bank of Egypt when it designed the Agricultural Bank of the Philippine Government, which was
established in 1908 and absorbed into the PNB in 1916 (Nagano 2003, 165–167).
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I-3 PEA, Economic Planning, and a Central Bank, 1934–35
Before being appointed as secretary of finance, Quirino had already reactivated the PEA.
He populated the association with several additional members in November 1933 when
he prepared to join Quezon’s independence mission, which Singson also joined (Tribune, 
November 3, 1933, 10).  After the last independence mission won another independence
act, the Tydings-McDuffie Act, on March 24, 1934, PEA members began to prepare for
a national economic program (Tribune, April 17, 1934, 2).  The members who led the
discussion reflected on the fact that the association was still composed of prominent
bureaucrats—Undersecretary of Finance Gomez was the presiding officer of the day, and
Assistant Director of Commerce Balmaceda was the secretary of the association (ibid.).16)
PEA members paid attention to Singson’s proposal and invited him for a meeting while
he was still the finance secretary (Tribune, June 24, 1934, 3rd ed., 4).
Cuaderno, the then PNB assistant Manager, became active in the PEA, especially
in the field of finance and banking (Tribune, November 3, 1933, 10).  Cuaderno, born in 
Bataan in 1890, graduated from the National University, became a lawyer in 1919, and
was hired at the Bureau of Supply.  He transferred to the PNB in 1926 (Cornejo 1939,
1657–1658).  He energetically dealt with the bank’s legal cases, specifically in its recon-
struction from damage caused by the financial crisis of the early 1920s (Galang 1932,
107).  Although he established his career as a lawyer rather than as an economist, he
received on-the-job training in banking during his time as a working student in Hong 
Kong (Ty 1948).  When the PEA expanded its membership, he became the vice chairman 
of the Committee on Currency of the PEA, headed by Chairman Unson (PEA 1934, xii).
Quirino worked for economic planning and expected PEA members to be the “new
dealers for the new Philippine Republic” (Tribune, May 2, 1934, 2).  The PEA, with an 
additional 27 members, published the results of its study and policy recommendations in
the form of a 270-page book titled Economic Problems of the Philippines (hereafter, Prob-
lems) in 1934 (PEA 1934).  In the preface, Quirino asserted, “Our national economic struc-
ture, with the severance of our relations with the United States, must claim our atten-
tion.  A comprehensive program of economic planning for the nation is imperative. . . . 
it is my hope that the work of the Philippine Economic Association in this regard will be
helpful in crystallizing the mind of the people on the necessity of economic planning”
(ibid., iv).
Quirino provided a time frame for his proposal and pointed out the actions to be 
taken during each period.  Table 2 reveals the three steps Quirino had in mind before 
16) Articles refer to the association as a society, but this writer prefers “association” based on the name 
of the PEA.
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the establishment of the commonwealth, during the commonwealth period, and after
independence.  Before the establishment of the commonwealth, he suggested that the
government focus on land issues and vocational education.  During the commonwealth
period, he proposed a more radical change in the economic structure, including the 
 establishment of a central bank.  After independence, he planned for the government to
enhance foreign trade, to deal with immigration issues, and so on.  The timetable and
agenda bear testimony to Quirino’s intention to change the comprehensive economic 
structure of the Philippines.
In the chapter of Problems on banks and other financial institutions, the committee
headed by Campos, president of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Rafael Corpus, 
president of the PNB, and Cuaderno asserted that the majority of the local banks had
agreed upon the idea of organizing a central bank (ibid., 219).  As for the functions of a 
central bank, “the power of a central bank to control the currency and the credit of the
country and to stabilize foreign exchange is a fact recognized by monetary and banking
experts” (ibid.).  Campos, Corpus, and Cuaderno argued that they should form a central 
bank to increase credit facilities, to stabilize foreign exchange, and to meet periodic
demands for circulation through note issues, all of which would help the government
achieve credit elasticity (ibid.).
In the chapter of Problems on currency, the PEA reiterated the necessity of a central
bank.  The committee headed by Unson and Cuaderno argued that the existing system
had failed to provide enough money in 1920 and 1921 and that the Philippine Islands 
should have a financial organization such as a central bank.  While they admitted that
“The Philippines is not in a position to adopt an independent currency at this time,” they
argued that “the main objective, therefore, of an independent system is an adequate
management of currency” (ibid., 242).  In other words, the PEA distinguished the issue 
of the enhancement of the banking system from that of the establishment of a new cur-
rency system.
Table 2 Timetable of Economic Planning
Time Period Issues to Be Addressed
I Period of general
preparation
Delimitation, survey, and subdivision of public lands. Speedy disposition
of cadastral and land registration cases. Colonization of public lands.
Extensive vocational education.
II Period of planning under
the commonwealth
Agricultural readjustment. Rural problems. Development of mines and
minerals. Promotion of manufacturing industries. Labor and population.
Domestic trade. Transportation and communication. Banks and credit
facilities—central bank. Currency.
III Period of planning under
the republic
Foreign trade, trade reciprocity and treaties. Immigration. Neutrality.
Source: PEA (1934).
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However, it was not true that Quirino gave up on the idea of establishing an auton-
omous currency system through the central bank.  He kept his movement confidential, 
because “A wide open agitation coming from above in the discussion of such a delicate
matter might invite alarm and misapprehensions to so serious a degree as to shake the
confidence of capital in the stability of the financial structure of the country and thus 
disastrously affect investments and business in general” (Quirino to Governor-General,
1935, JWJ, 13).  Quirino might have abandoned Singson’s strategy but not his idea.
In a memorandum to the governor-general on January 13, 1935, Quirino argued that 
the Philippines should establish an autonomous currency system and quoted Singson’s
proposal (ibid., 15).  Quirino, following Singson’s proposal, took it for granted that the 
Philippines should establish an autonomous currency system based on the gold standard
because, first, the Philippines was a gold-producing country, and second, because it had 
a simpler economic structure than the United States and other European countries (ibid., 
17).  He also agreed with Singson on the necessity to devalue the peso.  Taking into 
consideration an almost 40 percent devaluation of the US dollar in January 1934, Quirino 
suggested a one-eighth reduction of the peso against the US dollar, which would be almost
equivalent to the ratio suggested by Singson in 1933.
Quirino also proposed the formation of a central bank to conform to the international
policy idea, as well as to emphasize the merits of a national economy.  Like Singson, he
said, “The Financial Committee of the League of Nations would entrust a new important
role to central banks.  It has made these specific recommendations: ‘The aim of the 
Central Bank should be to maintain the stability of international prices both over long
periods and over short periods, i.e., they should both keep the average steady over a
period of years and avoid fluctuations round this average from year to year’” (ibid., 21). 
He emphasized that central banks were “necessary ingredients for the promotion of 
economy and finance of a country” because they would lower interest rates as well as
expand credit supply through rediscounting operations (ibid., 22).
Quirino, however, failed, just like Singson.  The Philippine Insular government
introduced Act No. 4199 on March 16, 1935, stipulating that two pesos should be equal 
to one US dollar regardless of the content of gold.  This was the first official introduction
of the dollar exchange standard that had come to be the de facto standard of the Islands
in the 1920s (Castillo 1949b, 429; Nagano 2010, 45).  The currency system of the Philip-
pine Islands “could be considered as representative of the evolving export economy of 
the Philippines under American rule” (Nagano 2010, 47).  Quirino’s proposal was influ-
enced by vested interests during the 1930s.
In addition to the US authority, Quezon publicly declined the idea of establishing an
autonomous currency system when he accepted the nomination for presidency at the 
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election for the commonwealth government.  On July 20, 1935, he declared, “I shall keep
our present currency system in all its integrity and will allow no changes that will affect
its value. . . . For the present I can see no reasons for any radical modifications in our
monetary system” (Tribune, July 21, 1935, 3rd ed., 1, 14).  However, although Quezon
did not share the idea of seeking currency autonomy with Singson or Quirino, he did not
persuade policy makers to abandon it altogether, as we will see below.
II Stalwart Advocacy for Autonomy in Economic Policy-making, 1935–44
II-1 Early Work of the National Economic Council, 1935–37
The PEA succeeded in persuading the then newly elected President Quezon to organize 
a central agency for economic planning, although it had failed to convince him to create
an autonomous currency system.  President Quezon sent a message to the National 
Assembly on December 18, 1935, to endorse a bill to create the National Economic 
Council (NEC), which would be responsible for giving occasional advice to the president
on economic affairs as well as for proposing comprehensive economic planning.  In the 
message, Quezon mentioned a certain limitation to the idea of laissez-faire and empha-
sized the significance of the active role of the government in economic affairs (Soberano
1961, 185).  The government created Commonwealth Act No. 2 stipulating the establish-
ment of the NEC, presided over by the secretary of finance (NEC 1937; Soberano 1961,
182, 192).  The establishment of the NEC and economic planning were the proposals of 
Singson, Quirino, and the PEA (PEA 1934, 213).
By the time the NEC began its operations on February 14, 1936, Antonio de las Alas 
had replaced Quirino as the secretary of finance and chair of the NEC.  Quirino was 
appointed as secretary of the interior.  Quezon initially preferred Roxas as finance sec-
retary, but he finally chose de las Alas after Roxas declined the offer (Romero 2008, 119).
De las Alas, born in Batangas in 1889, graduated from the University of Indiana and Yale
University as a pensionado, worked for the Executive Bureau, became a lawyer, and was
elected as a representative from Batangas (Cornejo 1939, 1586).  Before he was appointed 
as secretary of finance, he was the secretary of public works and communication (ibid.).
De las Alas was close to Quezon but was not as ambitious as Quirino or Roxas.  He 
seemed to be more an able administrator than an aggressive politician.
In the first report of its activity in 1936, the NEC explained the reasons for the 
inactivity of the council in an apologetic tone, rather than proclaiming its achievements
(NEC 1937).  After mentioning the lack of data, funding, personnel, and so on, the NEC
concluded, “The main reason [sic], however, why no complete economic program could
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be formulated at present are the uncertainty of our economic relations with the United
States and the limitations placed upon the powers of the commonwealth government by
the Tydings-McDuffie Law” (ibid., 31).  The uncertainty came from the ongoing trade 
conference, while the limitations pointed to the fact that the commonwealth government
could not enjoy any autonomy on tariff issues or currency (ibid.).  Former Governor-
General Francis B. Harrison, who was appointed as an adviser to Quezon, reported to
the United States that the NEC “was ‘paralyzed’ because all of the energies of the govern-
ment ‘are now bent towards getting a relaxation of the trade sanctions of the Tydings-
McDuffie Act’” and that another government attempt to promote diversification of the
economic structure was opposed by the “influence of the sugar interests and their lobby 
in Washington” (Golay 1997, 358).
The NEC report is intriguing, because it reveals that Filipino policy makers made
continuous efforts to establish an autonomous currency system and a central bank even
under considerable constraints.  The first report on the activities in 1936 said, “the peso,
under the present system, must follow the dollar for good or for ill, and the Philippines
is helpless to influence the American currency policy” (NEC 1937, 33).  The NEC advo-
cated that “The Commonwealth should work for an independent currency system, and
if granted, the gold bullion standard should be set up to take the place of the present
system. . . . With the establishment of a Central Bank as the necessary accompaniment
of an independent currency system, the management of the currency to suit the needs
of the Commonwealth and an independent Philippines could be easily accomplished” 
(ibid.).  It is easy to spot the influence of Singson’s 1934 proposal on this recommenda-
tion.  Singson was, in fact, a member of the NEC (Tribune, July 2, 1937, 1).
Gradually the idea of an autonomous currency system found sympathizers in the
legislature.  Assemblymen Benito Soliven and Juan L. Luna, for instance, submitted Bill
No. 2444 “to establish an independent currency system in the Philippines” (Luna and
Soliven 1937).  Luna, born in Mindoro in 1894, graduated from the University of Santo
Tomas and was a teacher and a lawyer before he became a member of the legislature in 
the 1920s (Cornejo 1939, 1903).  Soliven, born in Ilocos Sur in 1898, graduated from the
University of the Philippines and became a lawyer and a member of the legislature in the
1920s (ibid., 2151).  These two representatives, however, did not seem to have close
relations with Singson or Quirino, although Soliven was from Ilocos Sur, where Singson
and Quirino had also been born.  In fact, Soliven would contest and defeat Quirino in the 
election to the National Assembly in 1938 (Espinosa-Robles 1990, 46).
In the explanatory note of Bill No. 2444, the authors argued that the currency issue 
was “a grave problem” untouched during the trade conference (Luna and Soliven 1937, 
1).  They asserted that the devaluation of the US dollar in 1934 was harmful to the Phil-
Beyond the Colonial State 105
ippine economy, because the Philippine government would now pay more for its debt to
other countries.  They also asserted that the Philippine Islands needed to establish an
independent currency system based on the gold bullion standard (ibid.).  Generally speak-
ing, however, the NEC’s direct input is barely visible in this bill.  In fact, in the explana-
tory note the authors just briefly mention the name of Professor Jacinto Kamantigue,
who was a founding member of the PEA when he was still affiliated with the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue.
The fact that there seemed to be no clear cooperation between these lawmakers 
and the NEC reflected President Quezon’s conviction about the currency system.  In a
memorandum by Jones, Quezon was recorded as having told Secretary de las Alas in 
April 1937, “Please inform the National Economic Council of my fixed purpose not to
recommend or approve during my administration measures establishing a new currency
system.  The present system will be maintained in its integrity because, after consulting
expert advice, I am convinced that it is best for the country” (Excerpt from the Quarterly
Report of the High Commissioner, 1937, JWJ, 1).
Quezon reiterated his position to maintain the status quo of the currency system.
What follows is a record from a press conference dated October 6, 1937:
Press: How about the currency, Mr. President?
President: The currency?  That is tabooed.  [sic] That is definitely settled; there is no more talk 
about that. (Press Conference, 1937, MLQ, 20)
Quezon’s brief reply elicits two interpretations: first, the currency issue had already been
settled before the press conference.  Second, the currency issue was literally tabooed by
someone, although that was struck out with a line.  It is highly possible that the US 
authorities restricted Quezon from taking a radical position on this matter.
Jones, now the financial adviser to the American high commissioner, criticized Bill
No. 2444 in his memorandum to Washington (Jones to Coy, 1937, JWJ).  Jones first stated 
that the authors of the bill did not understand the existing situation that prompted the
Philippine government to adopt the dollar exchange standard (ibid., 1).  He reported that 
there had been no serious problems after the devaluation of the US dollar in 1934 and
that it was confusing that the authors condemned the US devaluation but asserted the
necessity of peso devaluation (ibid., 1–2).  The following concluding sentences of the 
memorandum clearly express Jones’ strong conviction about the existing monetary sys-
tem and his unsympathetic attitude toward Filipinos who were seeking autonomy:
First, because if any currencies survive in this world of uncertainty we can feel that the dollar and 
the pound sterling will be included; and second, the economy of the exchange standard and the fact 
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that Philippine foreign trade is so heavily over-balanced by trade with the United States that we 
can feel that now and for a number of years to come the Commonwealth and the independent 
Philippines can do more things with a dollar and do them more economically than they can with an 
actual gold peso. (ibid., 4)
The outcome was that Bill No. 2444 failed to receive enough support from Filipinos and
Americans.
Facing strong opposition from the authorities, the NEC shifted the focus of its advo-
cacy from making the currency system autonomous to creating a central bank.  The 
NEC’s second report, a summary of its activities in 1937 during which the council had
only two meetings (NEC 1938, 6), can be read as a record of its desperate efforts to win
support for its ideas.  In the report it reiterated that it was an internationally accepted
idea to have a central bank (ibid., 7, 9–10).  The report stated:
Since the war, under the leadership of the League of Nations, countries that have availed of expert 
financial advice of the League have established a central bank as one of the principal agencies in 
effecting the reconstruction of their disorganized economic life.  Today, most countries find the 
central bank an indispensable part of their economic system, and even countries that are not yet 
independent, like the Dominions, India, and Java, have already established a central bank. (ibid., 7)
Another point that makes the second report important is the cue taken from it in order
to figure out key advocates.  The NEC mentioned, “Vicente Singson-Encarnacion, a
member of the Council, has already framed with the aid of our technical staff the proposed
charter for a central bank in the Philippines” (ibid., 11).  Since we already know that
Singson had been active in the advocacy, it is more interesting to find out whom the NEC
meant by “our technical staff.”  We can easily assume who the technical staff was, because 
the NEC report reiterates that the NEC had very few technical staff (NEC 1937; 1938).
The first report said that Jose L. Celeste was the executive secretary, Castillo the tech-
nical adviser, and Juan S. Agcaoili the technical assistant (NEC 1937, 14).  The second
report said that after Celeste’s resignation in December 1936, Castillo was appointed as 
acting executive secretary of the council (NEC 1938, 1).  Two of the three technical staff,
Celeste and Castillo, were original PEA members.
II-2 Joint Preparatory Committee and Manuel A. Roxas, 1936–39
While Singson and others fought in the NEC, Roxas, who would be a significant advocate
for the formation of the Central Bank in the late 1930s, fought for the expansion of eco-
nomic autonomy in the trade conference.  On April 14, 1937, the Joint Preparatory Com-
mittee on Philippine Affairs (JPCPA) was finally formed “to study trade relations between 
the United States and the Philippines and to recommend a program for the adjustment
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of the Philippine national economy” (JPCPA 1938, 3).  Roxas joined the committee, which
was headed by Jose Yulo, Quezon’s close aide and an important representative of the
sugar industry (Larkin 2001, 169).  The activity of the JPCPA revealed the clear differ-
ence between the positions of those who wished to maintain the status quo and those
who sought a structural economic change.
Roxas was as keen about economic issues as Quirino and organized a movement 
named Ang Bagong Katipunan (the New Katipunan) to advocate economic adjustment
for independence in 1930, although he soon abandoned the movement—partly because
of Quezon’s indifference (Golay 1997, 292–293).  Castillo praised Ang Bagong Katipunan
as “The first serious attempt to apply economic principle [sic] on a national scale” when 
he explained the development of economics in the Philippines (Castillo 1934, 15).  Roxas, 
born in Capiz in 1892, graduated from the University of the Philippines and became a
lawyer and a representative in the Lower House.  He belonged to the same generation
as Quirino but had soared to the third-highest rank in colonial politics next to Quezon
and Osmeña in 1922 when he was elected speaker of the Lower House.  Quezon appointed
him as a member of the JPCPA because of his knowledge and experience.  Another
member of the JPCPA, the then Majority Floor Leader of the National Assembly Jose
Romero, tagged Roxas as “our leading economist” (Romero 2008, 134).
Roxas made his thoughts open to the public in a newspaper contribution before he 
joined the JPCPA, which was published under the title Philippine Independence May Suc-
ceed without Free Trade in the same year (Roxas 1936; Tribune, April 1, 1936, Sec. 4, 1, 
2, 4).  What he wrote about was close to the ideas of Singson and Quirino, although he
did not mention reform in the currency or banking system.  He argued, “Knowing that
we cannot be certain of the continuance of free trade after independence, the logical
course for us to take is to reduce as much as possible the relative importance in the
national economy of the industries depending for their existence on free trade with 
America” (Roxas 1936, 14).
Roxas’ voice, however, failed to gain the support of the majority in the JPCPA.  After 
surveying the process of the JPCPA, a historian succinctly summed it up thus: “It is 
clear that American economic policy toward the Philippines during the transition to inde-
pendence was designated to increase American exports and curb Philippine imports.  It
was a classic example of economic imperialism” (MacIsaac 1993, 345).  Echoing the US 
neglect of the Filipino plea, the JPCPA final report said:
Commercial banking facilities appear to be adequate in Manila and in the larger cities. . . . In view 
of the present structure of the Philippine banking and currency systems, there appears to be no 
necessity at the present time for the establishment of a bank in the Philippines whose functions 
would be primarily those of a central bank. (JPCPA 1938, 122–123)
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This conclusion, however, did not reflect the position of Roxas, who would soon be 
appointed as the new chairman of the NEC as well as the secretary of finance.
II-3 Continuing Attempts to Establish a Central Bank, 1939–44
Roxas did not abandon his idea of changing the economic structure of the Philippine
Islands after he was appointed as chairman of the NEC in August 1938, and subsequently 
secretary of finance on December 1, 1938.  On January 4, 1939, he held a meeting with
local bankers together with the NEC staff to discuss banking sector reform (Tribune, 
January 5, 1938, 1, 15).  He did not invite anybody from foreign banks, because he 
expected that economic readjustments should be carried out in cooperation with local
rather than foreign banks (ibid., 15).  The local bankers Roxas invited included PNB 
President Vicente Carmona, Bank Commissioner Pedro de Jesus, BPI President Campos, 
and Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) President Cuaderno (ibid.).  The PNB and BPI 
were the two biggest local banks, while the PBC was newly established in 1938.
Roxas’ plan, revealed on January 6, 1938, proposed overhauling the role of the PNB
(Tribune, January 7, 1939, 1, 15).  Roxas suggested that the government establish a com-
mercial bank, convert the PNB into an investment bank, and “set up a reserve and dis-
count department in the Philippine National Bank which will perform the same functions
as those of the federal reserve system” (ibid.).  It is impressive that Roxas did not refer
to a specific name such as “central bank,” and that he did not advocate the establishment
of an independent bank but proposed the setting up of a new department within the exist-
ing PNB.
His phraseology, however, did not reflect a retreat of the advocacy to establish a 
central bank.  As a member of the JPCPA, he must have been familiar with the strong
opposition from the United States, with whom Filipino policy makers had to negotiate to
pass any act regarding currency issues under the Tydings-McDuffie Act.  Roxas seemed 
to have chosen the least controversial way to propose a central bank under the circum-
stances.  What he expected from the department was, however, an enhancement of the
banking system and a reduction of interest rates, which were some of the roles Filipino
policy makers had expected the central bank to play.
Later on, the bill to establish the Reserve Bank of the Philippines was completed.
This time the bill was passed by the Philippine Assembly, signed by President Quezon,
and became Commonwealth Act No. 458, “an act to provide for the establishment of a
Reserve Bank in the Philippines,” on June 9, 1939 (Bureau of Banking 1940, 21).  The
Reserve Bank, whose design was taken from those of the newly established Bank of 
Canada and New Zealand (Cuaderno 1949, 4), would function as a central bank in the
Philippines.  The commonwealth government could not, however, implement the act
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immediately because it had to be approved by the American president.  Again, Jones
opposed the Filipinos’ attempts to establish a central bank (Jones to High Commissioner
1939, JWJ).  He argued in a memorandum that Commonwealth Act No. 458 was against 
the general policy of the Office of the High Commissioner, which had been supported by
President Quezon and recommended by the JPCPA as well (ibid., 1).
In the rest of his memorandum, Jones recorded the development of this move and
mentioned Cuaderno’s name.  Jones wrote that he had been told by A. D. Calhoun, man-
ager of the Manila branch of the National City Bank of New York, that Secretary Roxas
had pushed the Assembly to pass the bill despite Speaker Yulo’s skepticism.  Jones also
reported that “Mr. Mike Cuaderno of the Bank of the Commonwealth was the moving
spirit behind the agitation.  Mike is the more or less discredited former Vice-President
of the Philippine Bank of Commerce [sic]” (ibid., 6).  Jones’ hostility toward Cuaderno 
was obvious.  After briefly mentioning the initiative without any comments on Roxas’
personality, he emphasized the role of Cuaderno, who was from one of “the small banks
of the street owned by Filipinos,” and the uselessness—or even adverse effect—of 
Common wealth Act No. 458 on the financial system (ibid.).
Cuaderno was, however, an established figure as a lawyer-banker in the 1930s.  In
addition to his job as the deputy manager of the PNB and his participation in the PEA, he 
was an elected delegate to the Constitutional Convention in 1934 and became a member
of the Committee of Seven, which drafted the constitution (Cuaderno 1937).  At the
convention, he again advocated the establishment of a central bank in the committee 
report, as the chair of the Committee on Currency and Banking (House of Representa-
tives 1965, 52), although he could not convince other delegates to put the clause into the
constitution.  After resigning from the PNB in 1936, he became the head of the Finance
Mining and Brokerage Company, which was designed as an investment business in the
mining industry but was foreseen to become a bank providing financial support to other
industries (Tribune, September 6, 1936, 13).  Influenced by his work experience in Hong 
Kong, he nurtured a vision to promote manufacturing, rather than commerce, in his
country.17)
In 1938 he established the PBC, the first private bank with Philippine capital (Reyes-
McMurray 1998).  The PBC was small in terms of quantum of business, but it played a
significant role because it provided Filipino practitioners the opportunity to manage a
bank, unlike most of the big banks, which were controlled by foreigners and did not
provide Filipino workers with enough opportunities for banking experience.  President
17) Interview with Martin C. Galan (Cuaderno’s grandson) in Makati, Metro Manila, on December 6, 
2010.
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Cuaderno of the PBC would become the first governor of the Central Bank.  The first
vice president of the PBC, Alfonso Calalang, became the third governor of the bank (ibid., 
93).18)  Sixto L. Orosa, one of the founding members of the PBC and a prominent banker 
in the postwar period, later recalled that the PBC was “the Alma Mater of Bankers” 
(Orosa 1988, 35–36).  Jones’ aforementioned quote, however, failed to cite any of 
 Cuaderno’s achievements and rather worked to discredit him.
In addition to Roxas and Cuaderno, Celeste, a founding member of the PEA as well
as the first executive secretary of the NEC, took action to support the bill.  There was a
report on the history of the creation of the Central Bank written by a Japanese officer of 
the Southern Development Bank (Nampo Kaihatsu Kinko) in 1943 (Awano 1943).  The
book was, according to the postscript, based on A Reserve Bank of the Philippines written 
by a Dr. Celeste in 1940 (ibid., 44).  It would not be misleading to assume that the author,
Dr. Celeste, was Jose Celeste, considering his involvement in the proposal to establish
a central bank.  According to the author, Celeste mentioned the following four points as
reasons to establish a central bank: the currency system’s dependence on the United 
States, the imperfection of the financial structure, the lack of a credit market, and the
lack of investment credit (ibid., 1).  The points Celeste mentioned reflected the argument
of the previous proposals.  The fact that Celeste wrote this document reflected his con-
tinuous commitment to the restructuring of the economy.
The act, however, did not receive support from President Quezon and the Assembly. 
Jones reported the following personal remark by President Quezon on Act No. 458 at a
dinner held by the high commissioner.  Asked about Act No. 458, Quezon told Jones:
To tell you the truth, Mr. Jones, I did not want to sign the bill.  Joe [Speaker Jose Yulo] was not in 
favor of it particularly.  I signed it because I did not wish to indicate any opposition to Roxas.  I do 
not think the Bank will help us any.  It is useless unless we have an independent currency. (Jones 
to High Commissioner, 1939, JWJ, 8)
What this conversation tells us is that Quezon signed the bill only because he did 
not want to show his opposition to Roxas.  Quezon seemingly avoided any unnecessary 
confrontation with Roxas, who was still a man of influence—especially among politicians, 
having supported the Os-Rox mission in 1933—and might take over from Quezon in the
years to come.  Considering the lack of active support from the president, the National 
Assembly finally adopted a resolution to withdraw Act No. 458 from US government
consideration on April 19, 1940 (Bureau of Banking 1941, 29).
18) Calalang was the third governor (BSP 1998), although Marisse Reyes-McMurray wrote that he was 
the second (Reyes-McMurray 1998, 93).
Beyond the Colonial State 111
Even after the failure of the Roxas plan, policy makers continued to advocate the
establishment of a central bank whenever they had a chance.  In 1941 Castillo published
the first comprehensive textbook of economics in the Philippines, which he dedicated to
Filipino students (Castillo 1949a).19)  In the chapter on central banking, he summarized
the historical development of central banking worldwide and reiterated its necessity in
the Philippines (ibid., Ch. 19).  In this context, he gave the following brief explanation: 
“The Reserve Bank of the Philippines would perform the traditional functions of a central 
bank and make possible the establishment of a banking system which could adequately 
and efficiently provide the credit needs of business” (ibid., 438).  Here we can discern 
Castillo’s deepest convictions.
During World War II, he continuously advocated the establishment of the bank 
(Castillo 1943, 84–87).  He said that the central bank would be “a responsible guardian
of our monetary and credit system” (ibid., 84).  He pointed out:
Already prices are rapidly increasing, bringing hardships to consumers and the country has not 
gotten the right weapons to combat a run-away inflation. . . . With the successive and unregulated 
issue of notes together with those already in circulation, bringing the total to around 300 million 
pesos as against about 241.5 million pesos before the war, coupled with economic scarcity, there 
is little hope that prices could be brought under effective control at present. (ibid., 86)
The Philippine Assembly, in fact, passed a bill to establish the central bank on Feb-
ruary 29, 1944 (National Assembly 1943, 132–138; Cuaderno 1949, 4),20) but the bill was
not implemented because of the objections of the Japanese, who feared losing the pre-
rogative to issue military notes (Cuaderno 1949, 4).  The diary of the Japanese ambas-
sador to the Philippine Republic, Shozo Murata, recorded the last efforts of de las Alas
and Castillo, who joined an official mission to Japan in April 1944 and appealed for the
implementation of the bill (Fukushima 1969, 45–48).  Meanwhile, in the Philippines, 
Cuaderno as the president of the PBC wrote to de las Alas to open the proposed central
bank to curtail inflation in the Philippines (Cuaderno to de las Alas, 1944, MAR).  Before 
the results of their appeals could be declared, the war was over.  The agenda to establish
a central bank was taken over by the Republic of the Philippines, in which Roxas and
Quirino were elected president and vice president respectively while Cuaderno was
appointed as the secretary of finance and Castillo became the secretary-economist.
19) This writer uses the edition reprinted in 1949.
20) This writer is grateful to Professor Ricardo T. Jose (University of the Philippines) for kindly provid-
ing him with a copy of the National Assembly Bill.
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Conclusion
Two policy changes of the US government prompted Filipino policy makers to perceive 
the existing constraints of policy-making and recognize the necessity to change the sys-
tem of policy-making in 1933.  First, the HHC Act drove Quirino and others to organize 
the PEA, a network of bureaucrats and professionals who shared common interests in
economics, to study the economic consequences of political independence themselves. 
Second, the US government drastically changed its monetary policy to get out of its seri-
ous banking recession, and its policy change had certain impacts on the currency value
of the Philippine peso.  Although American colonial officers assumed the impact on the
peso was negligible, Filipino policy makers regarded it as a crucial sign of the absence of 
autonomy.
Ideas that were irrelevant to the existing interest structure but emerged internation-
ally encouraged Secretaries of Finance Singson and Quirino to propose the establishment 
of an autonomous currency system along with a central bank.  The ideas were supported 
not only by Singson, who had been out of the center of political power, but also by Quirino, 
who had been a close aide of Quezon.  They aimed to achieve autonomy in policy-making
and to establish a suitable institution necessary for an independent state.
The commonwealth period witnessed continuous endeavors by Filipino policy  makers 
to establish a central bank as well as consistent opposition by American colonial officers.
The persistence of the proposal, despite objections and failures, testifies to the fact that
the proposal was the creation not of a single individual but of a group of policy makers
who were determined to work toward its realization.  Roxas took over the proposal from
former Secretaries Singson, Quirino, and de las Alas.  The proposal grew as an agenda
that no finance secretary could afford to avoid and which was worth addressing to attain
renown as a new political leader.  Professionals such as Castillo and Cuaderno, who
scrutinized the issues and channeled the ideas into specific policy proposals, found like-
minded partners in the Finance Department.
When we consider the development of the political process, we cannot overestimate 
the role the US government played in establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines
after independence.  It was true that Cuaderno collaborated with some American special-
ists when they pondered on a suitable design for a central bank in the Philippines.  It was
also true that Cuaderno and Roxas had to prevail over opposition from other Americans.
History from the 1930s suggests that Filipino policy makers established the bank in 
spite of, but with help from, some Americans.  Looking at the broader picture, the policy
 makers appeared to be beneficiaries of colonial state building but were never satisfied
with the colonial status of the Philippines.
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These findings lead to a reconsideration of our understanding of Philippine politics.
First, the policy makers emerged from a changing political context rather than from the
existing interest structure.  Second, they took advantage of internationally accepted 
policy ideas to which American colonial officers paid little attention.  Third, they were
products of the US colonial state and yet at the same time promoters of Filipino national-
ism to change the colonial structure.  This study has thus revealed that the development 
of the colonial state spawned a group of policy makers who went beyond the realm of 
colonial administration.  In sum, the setting up of the Central Bank was indispensable to
the process of state building by Filipino policy makers.
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